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Abstract
The article explores and analyzes the foreign policy strategies of a declining hege-
mon. For this purpose, it develops an analytical framework for the classification of the 
strategies based on the two variables, costs and involvement. While amount of costs 
required to be spent in order to attain the goals of a certain strategy affects a hegemon’s 
power, and involvement represents the hegemon’s ability to achieve desired outcomes 
though participation in international relations, the variables empirically express the two 
attributes of a hegemon as defined in the theories of international relations - power and 
willingness to be a hegemon. Therefore, beyond classification of strategies, the analy- 
tical framework illustrates how implementation of each strategy affects the attributes of 
a hegemon. Based on the framework, the article defines the most optimal foreign policy 
of a declining hegemon by discovering the one that minimally affects the attributes of a 
hegemon by enabling it to preserve high involvement in relatively lower costs.
Keywords: declining hegemon, foreign policy strategies, hegemon, hegemonic system, 
isolationism, multilateralism, unipolar system.
within the international system without a war between the 
declining hegemon and its challenger(s).
The article establishes an analytical framework, which 
enables the classification of a declining hegemon’s foreign 
policy strategies, consequently, the most optimal strategy 
is ascertained and the mechanisms for implementing this 
strategy are defined. 
Establishment of an analytical framework: An ana-
lytical framework for the classification of hegemon’s foreign 
policy strategies is established based on the variables that 
empirically express the two attributes of hegemon – power 
and willingness that follow from the definitions of hegemo-
ny, indicated within the theories of international relations. 
These variables are referred as costs and involvement. 
When allocated on the two-dimensional axes, the costs 
measure the power required to be spent in order to car-
ry out a hegemon’s certain strategies. On the other hand, 
bearing in mind willingness to participate, the involvement 
measures the hegemon’s ability of achieving desired out-
comes in international relations. Therefore, involvement is 
measured on the merits of outcomes achieved throughout 
participation. Allocated on the axis this variable illustrates 
the extent of involvement a hegemon can retain in case of 
each strategy.
Introduction
Realist theories of international relations suggest analysis 
of the international system based on the existing distribution 
of power among its constitutive actors; the tendencies of a 
unipolar, also known as hegemonic, bipolar and multipolar 
international systems and impact of different arrangements 
of power distribution within the international system on 
states’ behavior and patterns of their interactions (for clas-
sical statement, see Waltz, 1979). This paper focuses on 
the decline of the unipolar system. Namely, it inquires and 
analyzes the possible foreign policy strategies of a declining 
hegemon based on the theoretical arguments presented 
in the literature of international relations regarding the es-
sence of hegemony and attributes of a hegemon; relation-
ship between power and influence; tendencies of the unipo-
lar system and its impact on the patterns of state behavior; 
conditions stipulating the decline of a hegemon; tendencies 
of the process of decline; patterns of state behavior and 
state interactions in the declining hegemonic system as well 
as the post-hegemonic world. Herewith, the paper is limited 
to the discussion of foreign policy strategies that a declining 
hegemon faces in case when a multipolar system forma-
tion is anticipated because of the decline of a hegemonic 
system. Application of the analytical framework the paper 
establishes for the classification of declining hegemon’s 
foreign policy strategies, is also limited to the peaceful sys-
temic change that implies the change of power distribution 
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Classification of Strategies: Classification of a dec 
-lining hegemon’s foreign policy strategies is achieved on 
the basis of the two-dimensional axes, formed by using 
above-mentioned/the variables – costs and involvement 
(see Figure 1). The axes depict four possible strategies for 
the declining hegemon classified on the basis of four possi-
ble groupings/balance of the variables: 1. high involvement, 
low costs; 2. high involvement, high costs; 3. low involve-
ment, low costs; 4. low involvement, high costs. The strate-
gies are labeled as multilateralism, hegemony, isolationism 
and declining hegemony. 
Revealing optimal strategy: Based on the theoretical 
arguments presented in the literature of international rela-
tions, a strategy referred to as multilateralism prevails as an 
optimal strategy and is described in detail. Multilateralism 
has inherent balance between involvement and costs and 
represents the only strategy which enables the hegemon 
to achieve higher degree of involvement with lower costs. 
Implementation mechanisms of the optimal strategy: 
After having defined a declining hegemon’s optimal strate-
gy, the next part of the article focuses on development of 
implementation mechanisms for this strategy. The optimal 
strategy defined in the frameworks of the article is oriented 
at lowering costs in order to retain relative power and de-
lay its descent in a way that hegemon’s ability to retain its 
high-degree involvement within the international relations is 
not jeopardized. The main mechanisms, which can be used 
to implement such strategy involve two major directions. On 
the one hand, this entails rejection of certain commitments, 
because of this the article categorizes threats into three le- 
vels. The cases in which a hegemon will need to be ready 
to act unilaterally or avoid such actions in order to lower its 
costs will be separated.
Another essential direction to implement the strategy in-
volves increasing the participation of other powerful states, 
including the rising powers to deal with common problems 
and threats, and eliminating free-riding from their side. For 
this purpose, suggested mechanisms, according to the arti-
cle, relate to persuasion and provision of positive incentives.
The mechanisms described in the framework of the arti-
cle differ from the mechanisms indicated in the existing lite- 
rature of international relations in three main ways. First, the 
mechanisms described in the paper differ from the ones il-
lustrated in the existing limited literature, where implementa-
tion mechanisms of a declining hegemon’s action strategies 
are presented in a theoretical and generalized way (major 
works that theoretically discuss a declining hegemonic sys-
tem or strategies for a declining hegemon include Gilpin, 
1981; Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984; Jervis, 2009; Kenne-
dy, 1987; Legro, 2005; Modelski, 1987; Mastanduno, 1997; 
Ikenberry, Mastundano, and Wohlforth, 2009; Treisman, 
2004; Posen, 2011; Mearsheimer, 2001). Second, although 
there is much literature available about the existing hege-
mon’s foreign policy strategies and their implementation 
mechanisms, they differ from the ones described in this arti-
cle, as they are specific and applicable to the current hege-
mon – representing specific recommendations for the USA. 
For instance, this part of the literature presents recommen-
dations such as the withdrawal of US troops from Europe, 
which of course when generalizing implies reconsidering 
hegemon’s commitments to decrease its costs in order to 
avoid reduction of relative power. However, when general-
izing recommendations in similar literature, the challenges 
emerge due to the gaps such as the absence of categori-
zation of commitments defining what type of commitments 
a hegemon may or may not reject. Therefore, in the article, 
unlike the papers fitted to the specific hegemon, theoretical 
mechanisms are described, which could be used as reco- 
mmendations for other declining hegemons that meet the 
necessary conditions set out in this article. Finally, the indi-
vidual mechanisms of implementation of optimal strategy, 
proposed in the scope of the paper, are found in existing lite 
-rature, but in a different context, and serve different goals. 
For example, Edward Carr (1946) as well as Robert Gilpin 
(1981) suggest appeasement as a strategy for a declining 
hegemon to be used towards a rising challenger. Strategy 
of appeasement as well as the above-mentioned strategy 
of multilateralism implies making certain concessions when 
dealing with rising powers. However, making concessions 
as implementation mechanism in the two strategies differ 
in terms of their timing, motivation and final goals. In case 
of appeasement, the act of conceding represents a part of 
the process of surrendering the power by a declining hege-
mon - an alternative to a hegemonic war, and in most cas-
es takes place when the process of decreasing the relative 
power reaches its critical point and a declining hegemon 
practically becomes no longer able to resist a challenger. 
In case of referring to the strategy of multilateralism - the 
act of conceding to the system’s other powerful states, in-
cluding the rising powers, represents a positive incentivi-
sation mechanism, which is used by a hegemon aiming to 
suppress free-riding and increase involvement of powerful 
states in terms of protecting the international order and pro-
viding stability to the international system.  In this case, the 
final goal of a hegemon is to lower costs and retain a rela-
tive power gap.  
Development of an Analytical Framework
and Classification of Strategies 
In the literature of international relations, a hegemon is iden-
tified as a state that has significantly more capabilities than 
any other and its security cannot be meaningfully threa-
tened by others (for a classical statement see: Jervis, 2009; 
Ikenberry et al., 2009; Waltz, 1979; Keohane & Nye, 1977; 
Gilpin, 1981). Although, power is not a sole habitual attribute 
for hegemony. A hegemon is also a state that undertakes 
a responsibility for the stability of international system and 
operation of international institutions, provision of legitima-
cy to the international norms and standards and formation 
of international agenda. Hence, for a country to be classi-
fied as a hegemon, it has to have two attributes: power and 
willingness to carry out the above-mentioned functions and 
introduce a rule-based order to international system. A com-
bined empirical expression of the given attributes such as 
the power and willingness relate to the outcomes achieved 
by the hegemon in international relations, which further is 
referred within the framework of the paper as involvement. 
Bearing in mind willingness to participate, the involvement 
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features the ability of achieving desired goals at the inter-
national level. Therefore, the involvement is not measured 
on the merits of active participation within international re-
lations, but is based on the merits of outcomes achieved 
throughout participation.
A hegemonic classification relates to the state, which 
possesses both attributes at the same time - power as 
well as willingness. The history of international relations as 
well as the present time endorses the notion that either of 
the attributes is not enough on its own. On the one hand, 
Russia possessing willingness, which is not reinforced with 
the appropriate power, is incapable to have an extensive 
impact on international relations as much as it would like 
to. Although, on the other hand, to consider the twentieth 
century’s USA prior to the Second World War, despite being 
superior in terms of power compared to other countries, it 
did not have the willingness to be included in international 
politics. For this reason, as such USA of that period is not 
regarded as the hegemon of the international relations sys-
tem at that time.
As a hegemon is defined in terms of power and willing-
ness, in order to undermine its status either one of them 
or both of them need to be weakened. On the one hand, 
a hegemon may lose its relative power that will eventually 
undermine its involvement irrespective of its willingness to 
participate in international relations, or at some point, hege-
mon may refer to isolationism, refuse to fulfill a hegemon's 
functions and exclude itself from international relations. In 
both cases, a hegemon descends its status and position in 
international relations.   
What factors undermine (attributes of) a hegemon and 
lead to its decline? Two realist theories – structural realism 
and hegemonic stability theory explain the factors that lead 
to the decline of a hegemon. Classical statement of the ar-
guments of structural realism belongs to Kenneth N. Waltz 
while the arguments of the hegemonic stability theory on the 
issue have been developed by Robert Gilpin. 
According Waltz, “in the light of structural theory, unipo-
larity appears as the least durable of international configura-
tions. This is so for two main reasons. One is that dominant 
powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders, 
thus weakening themselves in the long run” (Waltz, 2000). 
Reason for this for Waltz is the misuse of power which is 
stipulated by the fact that it is not checked/balanced by any 
other state or coalition of states. Same argument is deve-
loped by Robert Jervis. As he states, permissive structure of 
international relations – in other words, lack of countervailing 
power, create structural incentives for a hegemon to pursue 
excessive expansion. According Jervis, there are four facets 
to this argument: “First, power is checked most effectively, 
if not only, by counterbalancing power. … It follows from 
the propensity of states to use the power at their disposal 
that those who are not subject to external restraints tend to 
feel few restraints at all.” Second, state interests expand 
along with its power. “The unipole can pursue luxuries, and 
once a state has started to do so, it, like an individual, soon 
comes to see them as necessities.” Third, “the unipole also 
feels a compulsion to seek more because increased power 
brings with it new fears. As major threats disappear, people 
elevate ones that previously were seen as quite manage-
able. But there is more to it than psychology.  A dominant 
state acquires interests throughout the globe. ...and it is not 
only hubris that leads it to be concerned with everything that 
happens anywhere. The growth of power and influence es-
tablishes new positions to be defended.” Four, “as Realists 
stress, even states that are content with the status quo must 
worry about the future. ... However secure states are, only 
rarely can they be secure enough, and if they are currently 
very powerful they will feel strong impulses to act now to 
prevent a deterioration. ... so even if the unipole is not in 
danger it may seek to expand rather than accept a loss” 
(Jervis, 2009).
Waltz’s another argument for explaining the short dura-
tion of unipolarity is that “even if a dominant power behaves 
with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states 
will worry about its future behavior. ... As nature abhors a 
vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. 
Faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase 
their own strength or they ally with others to bring the inter-
national distribution of power into balance” (Waltz, 2000). 
As to the hegemonic stability theory’s arguments, de-
veloped by Robert Gilpin, they help to explain why decline 
occurs after a power has attained a predominant position. 
As Gilpin states, “Once an equilibrium between the costs 
and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, 
the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the 
status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to sup-
port the status quo. ... In order to maintain its dominant po-
sition, a state must expend its resources on military forces, 
the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated 
with maintaining the international economy. These protec-
tion and related costs are not productive investments; they 
constitute an economic drain on the economy of the domi-
nant state. Domination, therefore, requires the existence of 
a continuing economic surplus.” According to Gilpin, pro-
tection costs increase over time making the preservation of 
status quo more difficult. “The principal external factor un-
dermining the position of the dominant state is the increas-
ing costs of dominance. … Increases in the numbers and 
strengths of rival, challenging powers force the dominant 
state to expend more resources to maintain its superior mili-
tary or political position…. Because the dominant power will 
defend the status quo in its own interest, lesser states have 
little incentive to pay their "fair" share of these protection 
costs (the free-rider problem).” Besides, in the long run, 
world market economy spreads economic growth through-
out the international system, diffusing the wealth and factors 
of growth to the new centers of economic growth. These 
arguments draw Gilpin to conclude that “Once a society 
reaches the limits of its expansion, it has great difficulty in 
maintaining its position and arresting its eventual decline. 
… These rising states, on the other hand, enjoy lower costs, 
rising  rates of return on their resources... In  time,  the  dif-
ferential rates of growth of declining and rising states in the 
system produce a decisive redistribution of power and result 
in disequilibrium in the system.” (Gilpin, 1981)
Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes hegemon’s role 
in provision of public goods such as international stability 
and international order and the costs associated with it, and 
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subsequent free-ride of the rest of the states (key state-
ments include Kindleberger, 1973; Keohane, 1980; Krasner, 
1976; Gilpin, 1981; Russett, 1985; Snidal, 1985). In the un-
ipolar international system, a hegemon takes responsibility 
for the system stability. As a result, a stable international 
system is developed, where the international institutions 
function efficiently and international economic and finan-
cial cooperation is facilitated due to the existence of rule-
based order which is backed up by a hegemon’s power and 
financial resources. In such circumstances, the majority of 
states benefit from international trading and other type of 
international cooperation. Certainly, the world order formed 
through efforts put by a hegemon serves its interests in the 
first place. However, as time goes by, due to the increase of 
resources needed to maintain a world order, it starts receiv-
ing lessened pure profit from the system it has formed and 
maintained, whilst other states retain a free ride in terms 
of continuously benefiting from the system without carrying 
any extra contribution towards it. At such point, a hegemon 
starts to lose its relative power in comparison with the rest 
of the world. 
Meanwhile, the states with fast-paced growing power 
develop a desire to convert their newly attained power into 
appropriate privileges within international relations. They 
start questioning a hegemon’s special rights and privileges 
in terms of legitimacy of certain international standards and 
its role in a process of decision making within international 
entities. From this point, while the responsibility for provid-
ing the costs for the maintenance of the system’s stability 
still   relies on a hegemon, the exclusive privileges of the 
hegemon to lead international relations start to weaken. 
Questioning of the legitimacy of hegemon’s exclusive rights 
and privileges in international system as well as subsequent 
weakening of its authority will tempt states to challenge the 
order and stop conforming with the hegemon which further 
increases the costs of the maintenance of the international 
order and accelerates the decline of a hegemony. 
In order to retain a status for the maximum period of 
time, which is expressed by two attributes of power and 
willingness, declining hegemon’s primary objective be-
comes finding a difficult balance: on the one hand, it should 
attempt to decrease the costs relating to the ‘patronage’ (i.e. 
maintenance of the role of the so-called policeman) of the 
system, which helps avoiding the exhaustion of its resourc-
es and overall power, and on the other hand it should retain 
its maximum involvement in international relations, which 
reflects the willingness to participate in international rela-
tions considering the capabilities the amount of power pro-
vides at given circumstances. A peculiar difficulty of such 
balance relates to the fact that tighter cost controls lead to 
the decrease of involvement, whilst an attempt to retain a 
high degree of involvement implies the increase of expen-
ditures. Two-dimensional axes below present the possible 
foreign policy strategies of a declining hegemon in terms of 
different balances for the costs and involvement:
Figure 1: Foreign policy strategies of a declining hegemon
The vertical axis demonstrates involvement, and as 
mentioned above, is measured in the scope of hegemon’s 
outcomes throughout participation in international relations. 
Whilst, the horizontal axis demonstrates costs, which car-
ries an influence on a hegemon’s power - with high costs 
a hegemon faces a threat of power exhaustion, while low 
costs allow it to retain its power. Thus, the axes demonstrate 
four possible strategies for the hegemon facing a threat of 
decline: 1. high involvement, low costs; 2. high involvement, 
high costs; 3. low involvement, low costs; 4. low involve-
ment, high costs. Hence, the headlines for each   balance of 
costs and involvement are based on general policy, which 
a hegemon will have to follow whenever choosing a cer-
tain strategy, or whichever is expected in case of inactivity, 
in other words if a hegemon does not choose to change 
its strategy in the beginning of the decline and follows the 
stream. 
Ascertainment of the Optimal Strategy
and Its Implementation Mechanisms
From the four possible foreign policy strategies allocated on 
the axes above, the one entitled as hegemony that implies 
a balance of high costs and high involvement, represents 
a strategy a capable hegemon follows. A hegemon's initi- 
ative to provide the system with stability and efficient fun- 
ctioning requires a high degree involvement as well as high 
costs. Respectively, this strategy cannot be an appropriate 
choice for a declining hegemon, which should be attempting 
to preserve its resources. At the same time, inactivity or in 
other words a choice not to reconsider its strategy during 
a dynamic fall of its relative power, leads the declining he-
gemon to a threat of discovering itself in a condition where 
despite high costs, high degree of involvement is impossible 
to maintain. If the hegemon, whose relative power starts to 
decline still continues supporting stability with its own costs, 
then it will accelerate a decline of its relative power. 
It is important to highlight that even though a hegemon’s 
costs may still be high in the strategy of declining hegemo-
ny, its involvement in international relations will gradually 
weaken. As already stated, the so-called hegemonic peace 
fosters a favorable environment for cooperation, develop-
ment of international trading and financial relations. It is cor-
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rect to suggest that the world order shaped by a hegemon 
serves in the first place its own interests. However, peaceful 
international relations also provide decent opportunities for 
other states to develop and grow through either international 
trading or any other type of cooperation. In proportion with 
the rise of the power of other large states, increases their 
demand to find appropriate prestige within international rela-
tions, become more actively involved in formation of interna-
tional agenda and decision-making processes. As a result, 
states with growing powers  start  questioning a hegemon's 
exclusive rights and privileges, for which it becomes increas-
ingly difficult for a hegemon to achieve desired outcomes 
through international negotiation or other decision making 
processes while it still bears the costs to keep the world 
order intact. From this point, a hegemon comes across  cer-
tain obstacles in terms of providing leadership with an aim 
of organizing collective actions, achieve desired outcomes 
within international relations, provide legitimacy to certain 
standards or define rules of the game. Such undermining 
of the authority causes the hegemon to spend more to sus-
tain system's stability and international order – weakening 
the authority of the one in charge of maintenance of certain 
order encourages the actors with the breaching motives to 
act even more so. As a result, this leads to the decrease of 
hegemon’s relative power in comparison to the fast growing 
states. This is why a hegemon facing decline will still have 
to face the reality of limited involvement irrespective of its 
own desires even if it does not attempt to invoke the strate-
gies involving relatively lower costs.
Therefore, if a strategy located on the right side of the 
axis (hegemony) is not achievable, whilst the other one 
(declining hegemony) is a result of its inactivity/inertness, a 
hegemon will be able to choose between the possible op-
tions presented on the left side. The left side of the axes 
depicts two options, from which multilateralism offers lower 
costs alongside with high involvement, whilst isolationism 
suggests minimum costs for the system stability and its 
functioning, although this will lead to cancellation of its sta-
tus and the privileges/rights associated with it, as well as its 
impact on formation of international politics.  
Within the scopes of this article, multilateralism is re-
garded as a hegemon’s most optimal strategy, which gives 
the possibility of lowering costs and retaining high degree 
of involvement at the same time. Negation of the alterna-
tive strategy, isolationism is based, on the one hand, on 
the arguments provided by liberalism that emphasize the 
challenges related to implementing this strategy consider-
ing the level of globalization and interdependency among 
international actors common for the contemporary age. On 
the other hand, isolationism is negated based on the logic 
of structural realism, which considering the fear of jeopar-
dizing peace in a post-hegemonic world and existing uncer-
tainty in the international relations, implies the world states 
to be dismayed towards other powerful states. Considering 
this, in case of applying the strategy of isolationism an ex 
hegemon will not be able to stay unaffected and function 
peacefully. 
However, within the frameworks of this article, strategy 
of isolationism is still considered as an option a declining 
hegemon may choose depending on its own judgments and 
vision of future development. Choosing between the strate-
gies of isolationism and multilateralism, a hegemon, within 
a framework of its capabilities should decide if it wants to 
retain a maximum of its power or involvement. Both of the 
strategies imply challenges and certain risks that can cause 
failure.  
The challenges associated with isolationism, on the one 
hand, relate to is implementation, in the age of globalization, 
while on the other hand - arguments developed by the the-
ory of realism (structural realism) and its offensive wing. In 
anarchic international relations certain circumstances exist 
that do not consider isolationism within the framework of ra-
tional choices. According to realism, international relations, 
due to the so called 911 problem, which in case of need 
considers impossibility to invoke international help against 
a party breaching the world order, stipulates self-help condi-
tion where states rely on their own power capabilities (Mear-
sheimer, 2001). Therefore, offensive realism believes that 
there is no notion such as enough power, unless a state 
becomes a hegemon – no state can feel safe without in-
suring that it has exceeded in power all other potential op-
ponent states and their alliances. This is why, according to 
the offensive realism’s logic isolation and exclusion from in-
ternational relations means surrender and satisfaction with 
status quo, which is a dangerous mistake as in this case 
the changes in power distribution of the rest of the world 
stays beyond attention of the former hegemon embodied in 
its own shell. 
Therein, implementing a strategy of isolationism be-
comes especially dangerous in cases, when formation of 
multipolar international system is anticipated after the end 
of a hegemonic international system.  Posen (2009) deve-
lops similar argument and considers that: “The relatively 
equal distribution of capabilities in a multipolar world, with 
three or more consequential powers, produces one basic 
pattern of behavior: The arithmetic of coalitions influences 
matters great and small. The overall balance of capabilities, 
and the military balance in particular, are easily altered in a 
significant way depending on who sides with whom. Inter-
nal efforts cannot accomplish nearly as much change, at 
such a low cost, in such a short time. ... In a multipolar sys-
tem, states should lack confidence that significant military 
buildups can help them much, because other states can 
combine against them. .... Diplomacy becomes a respected 
career again under multipolarity. ... Isolation is perhaps the 
most dangerous situation in multipolarity, so states will pay 
close and constant attention to the game of coalition build-
ing.” (Posen, 2009)
Beyond the scope of offensive realism, a general idea 
of structural realism also warns about the dangers related 
to the strategy of isolationism. Realism views international 
relations as inclined towards conflicts rather than coopera-
tion. Dominion of cooperation within international relations 
links to a hegemonic international system, which is backed 
up by the international order supported by a hegemon, a so 
called hegemonic peace that decreases chances of large 
scale wars, fosters and protects international standards and 
rules. This, by enabling repetitive cooperation, formation of 
regimes and maintenance of stable international system, 
reduces defection threat and allows peaceful cooperation 
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to take place (on possibility of cooperation under anarchy 
see Oye, 1985; Jervis, 1978; Keohane, 1998). If a hege-
mon decides to apply isolationistic strategy and descends 
the curtain, the world will not stay the same on the other 
side of the curtain. Once there is no one responsible for 
the international system’s stability, realism assumes that 
conflict will prevail cooperation within international relations 
once again, which will complicate implementation of isola-
tionistic strategy even further. Within anarchic international 
relations, a hegemon, by creating public goods (such as 
stable security and economic order), fulfills functions that 
are similar to the ones of a central government. This, in the 
well-known confrontation between guns and butter makes 
it more or less possible for states to increase a share of 
butter. Therefore, a hegemonic system provides better 
opportunities to carry out isolationistic politics. Because a 
hegemon acts as a policeman and the system is stable, 
isolated state has better chances to retain its peaceful 
co-existence with the rest of the world. However, if it is a 
hegemon who chooses the isolationistic strategy, then no 
one stays in control to provide the international order. With-
out hegemon’s leadership, chances of more or less simi-
larly powerful states to provide international safety through 
collaborative actions are limited. A motive for a hegemonic 
state to retain system stability derives from it being a status 
quo state – it is in hegemon’s interest to retain a type of 
system which rewards it with a status of a hegemon. With-
out a hegemon, international peace would be a subject to 
multiple states’ collective action, although the probability of 
it to be  successful is low as not all states among powerful 
ones are status quo states. This means that such states 
may be interested in existence of conflicts in international 
system, which may shift a balance of power-relation to their 
advantage. Realism’s logic of functioning of the multipolar 
system adopts the notion that in anarchic international sys-
tem, powerful states are expected to hold hostile intentions 
towards each other. Posen, who reviews the anticipation 
of the Post-American multipolar system, suggests it is less 
likely that the states would directly confront each other in a 
world characterized with the existence of nuclear weapons 
-- possessed by vast majority of powerful states, where the 
scale of power of confronting states and coalitions is large. 
In such case, “defense dominance” originates in internation-
al relations, as a result of which “the pattern of competition 
[for power] will look much like an endless series of games 
played for small stakes. States will want more, but will not 
wish to court disaster.... competitors likely will believe that 
the safe way to improve one’s relative position is to pursue 
policies that weaken others. Increasing others’ costs when 
they undertake initiatives will seem wiser than undertaking 
one’s own adventures. John Mearsheimer’s [(2001)] “bait 
and bleed” strategies may become more common. (Posen, 
2009)
Bearing in mind the given ideas, realism views that in 
the post hegemonic age, a perspective for fostering coope- 
ration and safety through collective action is unlikely. A se-
cond traditional theory liberalism confronts this argument. 
Liberals believe that even though regimes that facilitate co-
operation in anarchic international system are formed in the 
environment where a hegemon exists, they possess a high 
degree of viability that helps them to continue their existence in 
a post-hegemonic age. According to Keohane international 
regimes are “easier to maintain than to create... Regimes 
may be maintained, and may continue to foster cooperation, 
even under conditions that would not be sufficiently benign 
to bring about their creation. Cooperation is possible after 
hegemony not only because shared interests can lead to 
the creation of regimes, but also because the conditions 
for maintaining existing international regimes are less de-
manding than those required for creating them. Although 
hegemony helps to explain the creation of contemporary 
international regimes, the decline of hegemony does not 
necessarily lead symmetrically to their decay.” (Keohane, 
1984) Therefore, Keohane views the international regimes 
that facilitate cooperation among states in different fields 
to be viable in a post-hegemonic age, as their retention is 
beneficial for states and the experience generated through 
their continuous cooperative work at a certain stage forms, 
on a game theory jargon, a repetitive game experience. 
This has shaped players to develop awareness of other 
players’ styles and anticipation of their actions that lead to 
diminishing the challenging factors of cooperation such as 
uncertainty about other players’ motivation and a threat of 
defection.  
Liberalistic viewpoints as such, do not take into consi- 
deration the meaning of relative gain in an anarchic inter-
national system, which is a foundation for realist theories 
about cooperation perspectives within the post-hegemonic 
age.  Liberalism deems that the benefit offered in return of 
cooperation outweighs fear and encourages states to ba-
lance conflicting interests to cooperation's advantage. The 
liberalism's argument is solid when asserting that regimes 
stimulate international cooperation. It is also well-grounded 
when they assert that regimes' viability in post-hegemonic 
age is high and benefits received as a result of cooperation 
is a good incentive for states to compromise and harmonize 
conflicting interests. The perspective suggested by libera- 
lism is not guaranteed; it is merely a scenario with a high 
probability to take place, which is the main flaw of this the-
ory. It can be disputed whether it is reasonable for states to 
act optimistically whilst relying on a sole probability factor, 
even if it is high, albeit it is impossible to exclude chances 
that some states may refer to the pessimistic scenario sug-
gested by realism, which involves a fear of defection and 
the notion of a relative gain that prevents cooperation. Such 
estimates put optimistically predisposed states in situation 
of prisoner’s dilemma as benefits acquired through coope- 
ration are beclouded with incurred losses in case of a poten-
tial defection.  Actions of pessimistically predisposed states 
influence other states, which otherwise would have acted 
in an optimistic manner, to become more cautious. Hence, 
there is a high probability that irrespective of continuous 
viability, regimes may not be able to overcome tensions 
conditioned by anarchy and be preserved only in so-called 
sphere of low politics.1
1Low politics is a concept that implies issues that are not absolutely vital to state survival and its security and is considered to be a domain 
of state warfare. In opposite to low politics, the concept of high politics covers the matters of state’s survival and its national security (Nye 
& Keohane, 1971b).
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In such case, the probability is high that the international 
order formed by a hegemon may develop cracks. This, in 
the end will lead to its demolition as a desire for coopera-
tion without the policeman maintaining international order 
may not overcome challenging factors such as a security di-
lemma, risks of a defection, or obsessive interest in relative 
power in conditions where the benefits received through co-
operation by participants are asymmetric. Once a hegemon 
decides to lead on to isolationism the world order may be-
come unsafe. In such scenario, it is unlikely that a hegemon 
will be able to pursue its vital interests peacefully, which in 
today’s world imply not only security of its own borders, but 
also entails access to other states’ resources, which are sig-
nificantly vital for the provision of sustainable development, 
competition for international market shares, protection of 
interests of national companies and products, etc. 
Therefore, beyond the logic of realism the success of 
isolationism in today’s world is highly unlikely, from the 
prism of another traditional theory of international relations, 
particularly according to the logic of liberalism’s complex in-
terdependency theory. In accordance with the increase of 
globalization and interdependency, more and more factors 
appear within the vital interests of states, which are beyond 
their own borders and require involvement in internation-
al relations. Therefore, in the contemporary world, for an 
isolationistic state the provision of its own stability and sus-
tainable development entails accomplishment of complex 
objectives. Nonetheless, isolationism within this paper is 
viewed as one of the potential theoretical strategies for a 
declining hegemon, which is a matter of preference for a 
particular hegemon when choosing its own future develop-
ment plan.  
According to the axes, the last strategy option for a de-
clining hegemon is multilateralism, which despite its low 
costs, still offers a high possibility of involvement (multilat-
eralism’s degree of involvement is though not as high as it 
would have been in a hegemon’s prime, despite the fact that 
at the given axes, in terms of involvement it is presented 
across the strategy of hegemony). The indicated strategy 
stands out for its dynamics, which requires a particular lev-
el of diplomacy in terms of implementation. Moreover, the 
strategy’s success depends on further development of the 
events and it is hard to predict in the beginning whether it is 
going to be successful or not. 
Strategy of multilaterism implies minimization of costs 
for a declining hegemon in order to stagnate a compara-
tive power decrease between itself and the rest of the world 
and to maintain the maximum level of involvement within 
international relations. To succeed in such endeavor a he-
gemon, realizing that it will not be able to take up the role 
of a system’s sole guarding policeman, has to clearly define 
its national interests within the international relations. When 
it comes to its national interests, hegemon should be ready 
to cover the costs as well as act unilaterally. However, he-
gemon should not act on its own and cover the costs on the 
actions involving all of the rest issues that do not qualify for 
the category of primary national interests. 
National interests of the hegemon are extended to the 
issues that do not display any direct threat against itself, 
but are threatening the whole international system’s stabil-
ity. The reason for this relates to the hegemon’s classifica-
tion with two attributes of power and willingness, implying 
that a hegemon will lose its status if it refuses to display the 
willingness to undertake the responsibility for the systems’ 
stability. A hegemon may not feel indifferent towards issues 
that do not display a direct threat to its national interests as 
well, however, it should avoid resolving all such issues on 
its own because it will exhaust its power and accelerate its 
decline, as well as encourage other states to practice free 
rides. Therefore, once important and less important issues 
have been identified, a hegemon's responsibility happens 
to be a mobilization of the international support to resolve 
problems that do not represent direct threat to a hegemon, 
but does represent a threat against entire international or-
der, hence, carries a certain jeopardy against every import-
ant actor of international relations. In this case, a hegemon 
would manage to lower the costs and at the same time, 
maintain involvement by sustaining the responsibility on in-
ternational stability. 
As mentioned, strategy of multilateralism implies certain 
challenges, it possesses distinguishable dynamics and as 
its outcomes depend on how events unfold, it is hard to fore-
tell if it is going to be successful. The challenges relating 
to this strategy involve precise and clear definition of what 
represents a direct threat to a hegemon on the one hand, 
and mobilization of the international support for a multilater-
al action pertaining to those threats that concern all actors 
in the system, on the other.  
For the declining hegemon, that chooses multilateralism 
as its foreign policy strategy, it will not be easy to identify 
those threats in cases of which it will have to act unilaterally 
as a last resort, or avoid actions to save on costs. A hege-
mon takes on a responsibility for the system’s stability and 
provision of security beyond its own borders. It acts as a 
policeman within international system. In order to provide a 
stability for the international system a hegemon by its own 
expenses tries to cope against existential threats aimed at 
the system. Such threats include large-scale wars between 
big states, spread of nuclear weapon(s), and also, relative-
ly smaller threats that are not direct or existential, but still 
can lead to system instabilities, such as regional conflicts, 
international organized crime etc. For a successful accom-
plishment of a strategy of multilateralism with an aim to save 
costs, a hegemon in the first place is required to separate 
the classifications of threats existing in the international 
system into groups, and then, identify the categories of the 
threats in cases of which it would act or not act unilaterally.  
Classification of the threats can be formulated in three 
categories, where the first category would include direct 
threats addressed against the hegemon's own national in-
terests, the second relating to existential threats aimed at 
the system and the third – non-existential threats directing 
against the system's stability. Obviously, a hegemon is not 
able to avoid responsibilities of taking actions against the 
threats from the first category, also, it will not be able to 
discharge its liability in relation to the threats from the sec-
ond category as they directly link to a hegemon's national 
interests. Besides, hegemon’s refusal to respond to the ex-
istential threats directed against the system's stability, will 
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undermine its status by disoperation of a hegemon's core 
function and suppression of one of the essential attributes 
of a hegemon, such as willingness to participate in inter- 
national relations.
Consequently, a hegemon may reject the unilateral ac-
tion relating to the third category's threats, in other words 
the non-existential threats directed against the system's 
stability. However, there might be certain challenges within 
the process of threat categorization, especially with the third 
category that should include threats not directed against na-
tional interests nor against the existence of the world order. 
The question is that a hegemon’s degree of involvement 
within international relations' field leaves a small number 
of issues, which do not intersect with the national inter-
ests of the hegemon. Since the prime time of a hegemon's 
power the national interests have been broadly defined, it 
will be difficult for a hegemon to detect the threats that shall 
not intersect with its national interests. As the strategy of 
multilateralism requires a declining hegemon to save on 
costs, a hegemon will have to redefine its national interests, 
which previously demanded merely full control on the pro-
cesses almost in the entire international system. It will have 
to define the issues, which represent or do not represent 
a direct threat against its security-driven national interests 
and reject the unilateral action in case of the latter one. In 
the process of threat classification, it is important to con-
centrate on the security-driven national interests in order to 
avoid the challenges associated with the threat groups for 
the first and second categories. The definition of security in 
the contemporary world involves traditional understanding 
relating to the physical safety of its territories, as well as po-
litical and economic sustainability, which in the end converts 
into power. Thus, categorization of the threats that directly 
jeopardize state security can be grouped into the ones that 
are set against sovereignty (including strategic and political 
threats) and economic threats. Hence, the first category will 
include the threats, which contain strategic and economic 
jeopardies set against a hegemonic state. Whilst the rest of 
the issues that do not represent existential threats against 
the international system will fall under the third category for 
which the responsibility will pertain to the multilateral ac-
tions accomplished by the international community or inte- 
rested actors (as ad hoc alliances).   
In addition, to categorization of the threats aiming to 
identification of them, in case of which a hegemon has to 
respond unilaterally, the following challenging step involves 
convincing the international community to act multilaterally 
in relation to the threats to which a hegemon decides not 
to act unilaterally for the sake of expenditure minimization.   
Therein, a challenge for multilateralism implies so called 
free-riding practice. A hegemonic international system en-
tails that a hegemon undertakes a whole responsibility for 
the international order, which allows other states to benefit 
from the stable international system and apply their efforts 
towards own development. Whenever, a hegemon, for the 
sake of minimizing its costs, asks other big states to provide 
support for the international system’s stability it faces diffi-
culties such as convincing the latter ones. The reason be-
hind this, is that other big states get used to the role of free 
riders, moreover, acting as a responsible citizen of the in-
ternational system requires redistribution of their efforts to-
wards international order, which otherwise would have been 
used to accelerate the pace of their own growth. Because of 
this, it is reasonable to expect that big states will tend to re-
main in the role of free riders as long as it is possible. In the 
meantime, a hegemon’s capacities to provide consolidation 
of the international community’s solidarity for the sake of 
retention of the international stability is limited. Traditionally, 
persuasion of second parties to undertake certain actions 
involves application of either positive or negative incentives. 
Although, considering the specificity of such occasion, it can 
be suggested that a hegemon can resort only to positive 
incentives. A hegemon is not able to restrict other states that 
have not contributed, to benefit from the stability maintained 
at a hegemon’s expenses. 
In addition, a hegemon will not be able to issue any 
punishment warning to the members of the international 
community that do not comply with their ‘citizenship’ duties. 
Such penalty would invite alienation of big states, turn them 
into constant challengers of a hegemon’s power and its 
world order, and respectively lead them to incentives rela- 
ting to formation of an alternative international order, which 
would accelerate the hegemon’s existing decline and col-
lapse of the international order. For this reason, remedies 
left for a hegemon to provide support from big states within 
the system involve persuasion and positive incentives only. 
When a hegemon tries to obtain certain support from the 
international community it should send clear-cut messages 
across and secure a sequential order of its following action 
asserted by international political shift. A hegemon should 
clearly demonstrate to the international community an ex-
tent of the damage that can be caused to the international 
stability if the above-mentioned third category issues are 
ignored, which as consequence will also reflect on every 
state. A hegemon should send clear messages, so that the 
big states will not expect a hegemon to cope with common 
threats unilaterally. If a hegemon corresponds its strategy’s 
asserted shift to the sequential order of actions, then it will 
be deemed as a clear sign to convince big states that it does 
not intend to cope with all existent sources of instability in 
the international system by its own expenses. Since the in-
stability that threatens the world order negatively reflects on 
the states’ security and prosperity, they become interested 
to act in order to avoid destabilization of the international 
system. It is interesting that according to the arguments 
of realism discussed while negating the strategy of isola-
tionism, a post-hegemonic multipolar international system 
would have less prospects to execute regular successful 
actions to trigger the big states step up in defense of the in-
ternational order, however, such prospects are much better 
in a hegemonic international system. In the case of multila- 
teral system, the states are more or less equal in terms of 
their capabilities, therefore none of them holds a capacity 
or legitimacy over others, to lead and guide the mobilization 
and implementation of collective actions. In a hegemonic 
international system, even at the stage of a decline the he-
gemon can perform duties of a leader – it still possesses 
the appropriate capabilities as well as the legitimacy that 
corresponds to the author of the international order as well 
the system’s supreme state, whose power is still unimag-
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inable to balance. Taking into account the significance of 
leadership, a hegemonic system offers better prospects for 
success when conducting collaborative actions. Although, 
throughout the execution of collective actions a hegemon’s 
leadership is not the only factor for improving the prospects 
of success. The existence of a hegemon secures the in-
ternational order and respectively a stable international 
system, in other words, mitigates the anarchy.  The factors, 
which in anarchy conditions form a certain distrust among 
the states are suppressed by intensive international coope- 
ration supported by a hegemon within the framework of dif-
ferent regimes presented in a hegemonic international sys-
tem. Aforementioned factors, unlike the multilateral system, 
form decent prospects for provision of international stability 
through execution of collective actions. 
To provide international support, apart from persuasion, 
a hegemon may also refer to the use of positive incentives. 
Despite the fact that a hegemonic international order pro-
vides benefits of peace to all states, its institutions are set 
up to serve its interests in the first place. Being the most 
powerful within the system and its creator, a hegemon 
certainly avails of appropriate privileges and authority. Al-
though, since emerging big states start to grow in power 
they start to claim their authority and status in the system to 
match their powers respectively. If a hegemon does not ac-
commodate such interests of rising states it will turn them at 
some point into system challengers, which is a threat for the 
system’s order and its creator - the hegemon. Therefore, 
adaptation of institutions, standards and processes within 
the framework of the international order, which at the end of 
the day should be done anyway in order to accommodate 
the rising powers and save the system, in this case, could 
be used by a hegemon as a positive incentive in exchange 
for the support from big states of the system to provide in-
ternational order collectively. The rising states of the system 
will become worthwhile stakeholders of the international 
system in exchange for the responsibility to protect it.
It should be noted that obtaining the support from big 
states to provide the order for the international system is 
contradictory in a sense that although saving costs for a 
hegemon will help to maintain its power, from another per-
spective it will undermine its authority and legitimacy to 
benefit from special privileges. If other states of the system 
get involved in maintenance of the international order and 
bear certain expenses, then within the framework of inter-
national order they may request higher privileges in reward 
for their efforts. Overall, a hegemon's decrease of authority 
in terms of providing the stability to the system will lead to 
weakening its privileges, which will be questioned more and 
more often by the rising big states. A hegemon’s efforts to 
decrease costs in terms of providing multilateral actions will 
result in gradual limiting of its involvement. While interac- 
ting with enhanced rising states, it will be much harder for a 
hegemon to achieve the outcomes it used to achieve in the 
prime of its power.  
Hence, even though in the framework of the strategy of 
multilateralism a hegemon is able to decrease its expenses 
and save its power, the progressive fall is triggered by an-
other variable - involvement. Respectively, the multilate- 
ralism's strategy does not allow a hegemon to preserve its 
original form. For this reason, it may be considered as an 
unsuccessful strategy. Despite this, multilateralism is still 
perceived as the most optimal strategy for a declining hege-
mon. It is right to state that implementation of the strategy 
of multilateralism, which aims at lowering the costs, triggers 
a gradual fall of involvement, however, as it has already 
been stated in case of the strategy of declining hegemony, 
hegemon would still not be able to retain its high degree 
of involvement even if maintaining its usual expenses in-
tact. Therefore, as none of the strategies offer retention of a 
high degree of involvement to a hegemon, the best possible 
strategy left is multilateralism, which suggests retention of 
relative power, on the one hand, by decreasing costs of a 
hegemon, whilst on the other hand by increasing the costs 
for other states as international stability within this strate-
gy is provided multilaterally. In conclusion, the strategy of 
multilateralism can be evaluated through long-term and 
short-term scopes. From a relatively short-term standpoint, 
the aim is to retain hegemony for the maximum period of 
time, although the overall goal of the strategy entails reten-
tion of as much power as possible for a post-hegemonic 
world, where with no policeman to maintain order, power 
becomes even more valued resource in order to secure 
states’ national interests ranging from survival to welfare 
and social security.
Conclusion
Within the framework of the article foreign policy strate-
gies of a declining hegemon were classified based on the 
variables that empirically represent the two attributes of 
a hegemon – power and willingness, which, in their turn, 
were revealed according to the definitions of hegemony pre-
sented in the literature of international relations. The two 
variables are costs and involvement. Costs reflect a hege-
mon’s power and in terms of a specific strategy, measure 
the amount of power to be spent while implementing it. In-
volvement, bearing in mind willingness for the active partic-
ipation in international relations, measures the outcomes of 
such participation in terms of attainment of the hegemon’s 
initial goals. Therefore, the variables – costs and involve-
ment – reflecting the attributes of a hegemon, with respect 
to alternative strategies, help to identify to what extent a 
hegemon implementing potential strategies associates with 
or deviates from certain standards, which are suggested by 
a hegemon’s classification given in the scope of the interna-
tional relations theory.         
The article has discussed two foreign policy strategies 
of a declining hegemon, the isolationism and multilatera- 
lism, which were revealed through identifying the different 
possible balances of the mentioned variables – costs and 
involvement. Isolationism offers a retention of a relative 
power by canceling the costs associated with hegemon’s 
involvement in international relations, whilst multilateralism 
offers a declining hegemon a possibility to maintain high lev-
el of involvement in international relations while decreasing 
costs that enable retention of its relative power. For this rea-
son, in the scope of the article, multilateralism is regarded 
16
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878; e-ISSN: 2346-8262; Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016
Baia IVANEISHVILI
as the most optimal foreign policy strategy for a declining 
hegemon. However, slow decline of involvement implied in 
the strategy of multilateralism as well as the rise of the new 
power centers conditioned by the stable economic and se-
curity order introduced by a hegemon, in the end, even in 
the case of successful multilateralism means a hegemon's 
fall but through slower decline than in case of any other for-
eign policy strategy hegemon could follow. Therefore, the 
aims of strategy of multilateralism can be split in two parts: a 
relatively short-term aim to extend a hegemony, and a long-
term aim to maintain power for a post-hegemonic world.
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